BILL WILLARD, dba PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVERTISING, Appellant, v. HAROLD BUCK, Respondent
Willard v. Buck
Collins, C. J., Batjer and Mowbray, JJ., concur.
BILL WILLARD, dba PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVERTISING, Appellant, v. HAROLD BUCK, Respondent.
BILL WILLARD, dba PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVERTISING, Appellant, v. HAROLD BUCK, Respondent.
No. 5592
January 15, 1969
449 P.2d 471
Denton & Monsey, and Margaret Ann Willoughby, of Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Morse, Graves, Parraguirre & Rose, Ltd., and John Taylor, of Las Vegas, for Respondent.
OPINION
By the Court,
Zenoff, J.:
Appellant Willard supervised the campaign advertising for respondent Buck's unsuccessful 1963 bid for the office of Las Vegas City Commissioner. Willard contends that he is entitled to compensation for his services under an alleged oral contract with Buck. Buck contends that Harry Kaye was the person who promised to pay for the campaign expenses. The district court held that Willard had failed to show the existence of a contract with Buck by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore ruled in favor of Buck.
It is well-established that when nongratuitous services are rendered for one who is not a relative, and these services are voluntarily accepted, an inference or presumption arises that the beneficiary promises to pay for these services. Morrill v. United States, 228 F.Supp. 734 (D.Me. 1964); Keeton v. Bozark, 339 S.W.2d 123 (Ark. 1960); Williams v. Dougan, 346 P.2d 241 (Cal.App. 1959); In re Martin's Estate, 155 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1968); Smith v. Sypret's Estate, 421 S.W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1967); Cronn v. Fisher, 422 P.2d 276 (Ore. 1966); Gename v. Benson, 153 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1967); In re Voss' Estate, 121 N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1963); In re Kuepper's Estate, 107 N.W.2d 621 (Wis. 1961); Fieldhouse Landscape, Inc. v. Gentile, 107 N.W.2d 491 (Wis. 1961); cf. Bangle v. Holland Realty Inv. Co., 80 Nev. 331, 393 P.2d 138 (1964); Annotation, 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949); 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 566 (1960). This rule is particularly applicable when, as in this case, the beneficiary requests the services. The burden of proof is on the beneficiary to rebut the inference or presumption.
It appears that there was sufficient proof given here to raise the presumption that Buck intended to pay for the services he requested and received. The trial court apparently believed that the evidentiary presentations proving and disproving a contract between Willard and Buck were equally persuasive and that therefore the appellant had not proven a contract by a preponderance of the evidence. It does not appear that either counsel or the court were aware of the operation of the presumption. If the trial court believes that the evidence was equally weighted, the presumption has not been overcome and the court must find for Willard. If the trial court believes that respondent has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Willard's claims were to be paid by Harry Kaye, then it must find for Buck.
We therefore remand to the trial court for a reconsideration of the evidence and appropriate findings in light of the rule announced here. Another trial is not required.
Collins, C. J., Batjer and Mowbray, JJ., concur.