MINERAL COUNTY; MINERAL COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; and MINERAL COUNTY ASSESSOR, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, BOARD OF EQUALIZATION and DAY & ZIMMERMAN HAWTHORNE CORPORATION, Respondents
Mineral County v. State, Board of Equalization
Hardesty, J., with whom Becker, C. J., and Douglas, J., agreed, dissented.
MINERAL COUNTY; MINERAL COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; and MINERAL COUNTY ASSESSOR, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, BOARD OF EQUALIZATION and DAY & ZIMMERMAN HAWTHORNE CORPORATION, Respondents.
MINERAL COUNTY; MINERAL COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; and MINERAL COUNTY ASSESSOR, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, BOARD OF EQUALIZATION and DAY & ZIMMERMAN HAWTHORNE CORPORATION, Respondents.
No. 40609
September 15 , 2005
119 P.3d 706
Hardesty, J., with whom Becker, C. J., and Douglas, J., agreed, dissented.
Andrew A. List, Carson City; Rachel H. Nicholson, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, for Appellants.
Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, and Dawn Nala Kemp, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent State Board of Equalization.
Hawkins Folsom & Muir and Gordon R. Muir, Reno, for Respondent Day & Zimmerman Hawthorne Corporation.
Noel Waters, District Attorney, and Mary-Margaret Madden, Deputy District Attorney, Carson City, for Amicus Curiae Carson City County Assessor.
OPINION
By the Court,
Maupin, J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether a county may seek judicial review of decisions issued by the State Board of Equalization (State Board) under NRS Chapter 233B, the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We conclude that it may.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Day & Zimmerman Hawthorne Corporation (DZHC) contracts with the federal government to manage and maintain the Hawthorne Ammunition Depot in Mineral County, Nevada. DZHC disputed Mineral County's valuations of the depot for tax years 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. As a result, the State Board reviewed the County's valuations and issued two decisions resulting in a substantial net decrease in taxable value. Shortly thereafter, the County filed separate petitions for judicial review under the APA. The State Board and DZHC moved jointly to dismiss the petitions. The district court granted the motions, concluding that NRS 361.420, which specifies procedures for "property owner" appeals of State Board determinations, impliedly prohibits challenges to State Board determinations by persons or entities other than "property owners." Mineral County appeals.
As NRS 361.420 is silent with regard to a county's ability to seek judicial review of State Board decisions, we hold that a county may petition for judicial review of such determinations under the APA, in particular, NRS 233B. 130(1). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order.
DISCUSSION
Construction of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. This court interprets statutes according to their plain meaning unless such an interpretation would run contrary to the spirit of the statutory scheme. Potentially conflicting statutes are harmonized whenever possible.
The County claims authority to challenge State Board decisions under NRS 233B. 130(1), which addresses an aggrieved party's ability to obtain judicial review of a state agency decision, as follows:
1. Any party who is:
(a) Identified as a party of record by an agency in an administrative proceeding; and
(b) Aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, is entitled to judicial review of the decision.
Relying upon language from NRS 233B.020(2), stating that "[t]he provisions of [NRS Chapter 233B] are intended to supplement statutes applicable to specific agencies," the County argues that the APA simply augments the taxpayer appeal provisions of NRS Chapter 361, thus permitting local government entities to petition for judicial review.
The State Board responds that a reading of other language within the APA requires deference to the more specific administrative procedures set forth in NRS Chapter 361. In this, the State Board relies upon the statement in NRS 233B.020(2) that "[NRS Chapter 233B] does not abrogate or limit additional requirements imposed on such agencies by statute or otherwise recognized by law," and further upon NRS 361.420(2), which provides that property owners may institute an action if denied relief by the State Board:
The property owner, having protested the payment of taxes as provided in subsection 1 and having been denied relief by the State Board of Equalization, may commence a suit in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Nevada against the State and county in which the taxes were paid .
The State Board argues that NRS 361.420(2), when read with NRS 233B. 020(2), specifically limits district court jurisdiction over its decisions to petitions for judicial review brought by taxpayers or property owners. The State Board underscores its argument by reference to NRS 361.410(1), which states in part that "[n]o taxpayer may be deprived of any remedy or redress in a court of law relating to the payment of taxes, but all such actions must be for redress from the findings of the State Board of Equalization.' ' (Emphasis added.)
Given the discrete language governing NRS Chapter 361 challenges to State Board decisions, the State Board argues that NRS Chapter 361 procedures preempt the APA under the fundamental principles of statutory construction; here, that statutes specific to particular sets of circumstances take precedence over statutes of general application. From this, as stated, the State Board reasons that NRS 361.410(1) and NRS 361.420(2) exclusively govern judicial review of State Board decisions, thus depriving local governments of a medium for review when such decisions are adverse to them. We disagree.
NRS 361.410(1) and NRS 361.420(2) provide a specific mechanism for taxpayers to protest State Board valuations. Neither explicitly precludes local governments from doing so. And neither abrogates or limits the rights of property holders to challenge State Board decisions. Thus, even though NRS 361.410(1) and NRS 361.420(2) include specific provisions concerning taxpayer protections, these statutes do not take precedence over the APA under these circumstances, as they do not expressly govern the rights of a local government such as Mineral County. Consequently, we conclude that the provisions of NRS Chapter 361 supplement, rather than preempt, the provisions of NRS Chapter 233B, particularly NRS 233B.130(l)'s provision that an aggrieved party may petition for judicial review of an agency decision. This interpretation is optimal because it permits harmonious construction of NRS Chapter 233B and NRS Chapter 361.
Policy reasons also support our decision on this issue. For instance, denying a county's right to judicial review would allow the State Board to set binding precedent regarding state tax legislation, which could subject county citizens to an unjust outcome and an inequitable distribution of taxes in the event of an incorrect interpretation and application of law. Further, interpreting NRS Chapter 361 as restricting a local government's right to seek judicial review of a State Board decision would leave local governments without a remedy in such instances.
CONCLUSION
As NRS 361.420 presents no barrier to a county's right to seek judicial review of a State Board decision, Mineral County may seek judicial review under NRS 233B. 130(1). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order dismissing Mineral County's petitions and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Gibbons and Parraguirre, JJ., concur.
Gilman v. State, Bd. of Vet. Med. Exam'rs, 120 Nev. 263, 271, 89 P.3d 1000, 1005-06 (2004).
University Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 731, 100 P.3d 179, 193 (2004).
Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 587, 97 P.3d 1132, 1140 (2004).
See SIIS v. Miller, 112 Nev. 1112, 1118, 923 P.2d 577, 580 (1996).
The State Board asserts that the Legislature's explicit provision for county petitions seeking judicial review of Nevada Tax Commission decisions under NRS 360.245(7) demonstrates legislative intent to preclude county petitions for judicial review of State Board decisions. We disagree and conclude that had the Legislature intended to preclude county petitions of State Board decisions, it could have explicitly stated that intent.
We also reject the State Board's assertion that the history of legislation introduced during the 2005 legislative session as S.B. 186 — demonstrating that the bill "died" in committee — determines the issue presented in this case. An uncontradicted affidavit submitted by a proponent of the bill, who also represents Mineral County in this case, indicates that the proponents withdrew the bill before the Legislature could hilly consider it.