JOHNSON v. INTERNATIONAL OF THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, Local Union No. 971, Et Al.
Johnson v. International of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No. 971
Ducker, C. J., I concur.
JOHNSON v. INTERNATIONAL OF THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, Local Union No. 971, Et Al.
JOHNSON v. INTERNATIONAL OF THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, Local Union No. 971, Et Al.
No. 2877
May 21, 1930.
288 P. 170.
Frame & Raffeto, for Appellant:
Thatcher & Woodbwrn, for Respondents:
OPINION
By the Court,
Coleman, J.:
On and some time prior to September 13, 1926, the plaintiff was a member of local union No. 971, a subordinate of the International of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, an unincorporated benefit society. At a meeting held on the date mentioned, a motion was adopted by said local expelling plaintiff from membership therein.
This suit was instituted to .enjoin defendants from excluding plaintiff from membership in said organization, for damages, and for general equitable relief.
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that plaintiff was willfully, wrongfully, and maliciously expelled from defendant organization, and that no written charges were filed against him; that he was not given a trial as guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the organization; and alleged that he had exhausted all remedies available to him within the organization.
The complaint pleads section 55 of the constitution and laws of the defendant organization, which provides that charges alleging an offense must be made in writing and must specify the offense or offenses charged and the section violated, and must be signed by the member making the charge; that the charges must be read at the meeting and lay over until the next meeting; that the member charged must be notified and furnished a copy of the charges by registered mail; that all charges must be referred to a trial committee; that the accused shall be allowed until the next regular meeting to appear and reply; that the chairman of the committee shall summon the accused in writing, together with the witnesses for and against him.
The constitution and laws also provide that any member having a grievance may appeal to the general president for redress, subject to a further appeal to the general executive board and a final appeal to the general convention. It also provides that a member must exhaust his resources allowed by the constitution and laws within the organization before taking his case to the civil courts.
The defendants answered, denying, inter alia, the material allegations of the complaint alleging that no written charges were filed against the plaintiff and that he was wrongfully, willfully, and maliciously expelled from defendant organization without written charges having been filed against him. The answer admits that no trial was given the plaintiff, but alleges that he pleaded guilty to the charges which had theretofore been preferred.
Upon the trial, a judgment was entered dismissing the suit at the cost of plaintiff, upon the ground that he had not exhausted his remedies within the defendant organization.
The evidence, though conflicting on that point, shows that a written charge was presented against the defendant on September 13, 1926, as follows:
"The following is the statement made by D. E. Johnson in the presence of Chas. Varney and Chas. Warner.
"Why in hell don't they change the name of the S. of a B. of an organization from the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America to the Contractors and Petty Politicians Association. [Signed] Chas. H. Varney."
After the charge was read, the defendant stated that a part of the matter stated was true and that.a part of it was false, and demanded a trial as provided in the laws of the organization. The chairman of the local held that the plaintiff had pleaded guilty and that no •trial was necessary.
The minutes of the local, as corrected, read: "Motion by Brother C. H. Varney that Brother D. E. Johnson be expelled for trying to create dissension and working against the harmony of the United Brotherhood."
The motion was adopted, and Johnson was requested to leave the hall. Thereafter Johnson took an appeal to the general president, who dismissed the appeal on the ground that the local acted for the best interest of the membership; but he took no further appeal.
Section 54, par. B, of the constitution, provides: "Any officer or member who endeavors to create dissension among the members or works against the interest and harmony of the United Brotherhood shall be expelled. "
Paragraph B, sec. 55, of the constitution and laws of defendant organization, is as follows: "All charges must be made in. writing, and must specify the offense or offenses, and the Section of the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood so violated, and be signed by the member or members making such charges."
The charge fails utterly to comply with this requirement. It does not specify any offense; neither does it specify the section of the constitution and laws alleged to have been violated. To constitute an offense, it must specifically charge that he was guilty of some act or acts prohibited by some law of the organization.
Assuming that it was the intent to charge Johnson with violation of section 54, par. B, an endeavor to create dissension is an essential element of the offense to be embraced in the charge. This element is not embraced in the charge against Johnson; hence he was not charged with the offense of endeavoring to create dissension among the members. While the language Johnson is charged with using is scandalous and reprehensible, it does not necessarily charge him with endeavoring to create dissension. We appreciate that courts should not be anxious to require such charges to be strictly technical, but they should convey to the accused a knowledge of the charge made against him. This was no doubt the purpose of providing that the charge should refer to the section upon which the charge is based.
As the charge did not contain an essential element of an offense, Johnson might have admitted the truth of everything contained therein unreservedly, and still not plead guilty to violating a law of the organization.
But, if we were to concede .that the written charge alleged an offense, the judgment would have to be reversed, for the reason that there was no plea of guilty, nor a trial. It is clear that Johnson never intended to plead guilty, for the reason that he demanded at the time a trial as guaranteed by the constitution and laws. The failure to afford Johnson this privilege renders the proceedings absolutely null and void. In Wachtel v. Noah Widows' & Orphans' Soc., 84 N. Y. 28, 38 Am. Rep. 478, it is said: "It is well settled that an association whose members become, entitled to privileges or rights of property therein cannot exercise its power of expulsion without notice to the person charged, or without giving him an opportunity to be heard."
While there seem to be some authorities which hold that, whether an expulsion be void or irregular, the aggrieved party must exhaust his remedies within the offending body, the great weight of authority is to the effect that, where the proceedings resulting in suspension, expulsion, or other penalty, are not conducted in compliance with the requirements of the organization itself, or are contrary to law and the fundamental principles of justice, the aggrieved member may apply at once to the civil courts for relief.
In Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benev. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217, 219, 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, the court, in a concise, terse opinion, held that one who had paid his dues and assessments, and who was entitled to participate in the benefit feature of the association, had property rights involved, which, if violated, entitled him to the protection of the courts. We quote from the opinion: " jn y^g matter of expulsion the society acts in a quasi judicial character, and, so far as it confines itself to the exercise of the powers vested in it, and in good faith pursues the methods prescribed by its laws, such laws not being in violation of the laws of the land, or any inalienable right of the member, its sentence is conclusive, like that of a judicial tribunal. Com. v. [Pike Beneficial] Society, 8 Watts & S. [Pa.] 250; Burt v. Lodge, 44 Mich. 208; [Id., 66 Mich. 85], 33 N. W. 13; Robinson v. Lodge, 86 Ill. 598. The courts will, however, decide whether the ground for expulsion is well taken. Hirs. Frat. & Soc. 55; [Savannah] Cotton Exchange v. State, 54 Ga. 668. It has been held in reference to the expulsion of members from societies of this character, that the courts have no right to interfere with the decisions of the societies, except in the following cases: 'First. If the decision arrived at was contrary to natural justice, such as the member complained of not having an opportunity to explain misconduct. Secondly. If the rules of the club have not been observed. Thirdly. If the action of the club was malicious and not bona fide.' Hirs. Frat. & Soc. 56; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 44 Law T. 557; Lambert v. Addison, 46 Law T. 20."
The conclusion of the court was that the plaintiff did not have a fair trial by the defendant and that the plaintiff should be reinstated.
The general rule applicable to cases of suspension or expulsion by organizations of the character of the defendant is correctly stated in 5 C. J. pp. 1358, 1359, as follows:
"In the matter of the suspension or expulsion of a member, the association acts in a quasi judicial capacity, and where the society, fairly and in good faith, acts within its powers, and in accordance with its laws and the law of the land, its decision, like that of a judicial tribunal, is conclusive as against a collateral attack. "
"Conversely, a court of equity will reinstate a member, where the association, in suspending or expelling him, acted unfairly or in bad faith, or beyond its powers, and not in accordance with its laws or the law of the land, such relief being granted by way of a decree annulling the wrongful suspension or expulsion, adjudging the member to be entitled to the rights and privileges of membership,- and directing his restoration or reinstatement, or enjoining the association from depriving him of such rights and privileges or interfering therewith. Accordingly, the court may inquire into the power and jurisdiction of the association to suspend or expel the member, the reasonableness and propriety of the suspension or expulsion and the grounds thereof, and the regularity of the proceedings.
"Before applying to a court of equity for reinstatement, a disfranchised member must as a rule exhaust all remedies available to him under the laws of the association. But this rule does not apply where the association, in suspending or expelling the member, acted entirely without jurisdiction, it has been held, or where the remedy provided by the laws of the society is not available to the member, or there is an extremely remote possibility of its proving effective; and the rule is of course inapplicable where no remedy is afforded by the laws of the association."
It is said in Bacon, Benefit Societies (3d ed.), sec. 107, that: " It is, however, well settled that: 'If the action of the lodge be a usurpation, or without notice or authority, it cannot affect the legal rights or change the legal status of any one. The obligation to appeal is not imposed when the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. It may be likened to a judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the person. No appeal or writ of error is necessary to get rid of such a judgment. It is void in all courts and places, and the duty of an expelled member to exhaust, by appeals or otherwise, all the remedies within the organization arises only where the association is acting strictly within the scope of its powers.' "
Such is the law as recognized by all authorities in England and by a great weight of authority in the United States. Sustaining the view stated, we mention some of the authorities. Wayman v. Perseverance Lodge, 1 K. B. (Eng.) 677, 116 L. T. N. S. 14, 86 L. J. K. B. 243; Innes v. Wylie, 1 Car. & K. 257 (Eng.); State ex rel. Cicoria v. Corgiat, 50 Wash. 95, 96 P. 689; Fales v. Musicians' Pro. Ass'n., 40 R. I. 34, 99 A. 823; Venezia v. Italian, etc., 74 N. J. Law, 433, 65 A. 898; Most Wor. United Grand Lodge v. Lee, 128 Md. 42, 96 A. 872, Ann. Cas. 1918e, 1174; Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N. M. 534, 174 P. 992; Pratt v. Amalgamated, etc., 50 Utah, 472, 167 P. 830; Black & White Smiths' Soc. v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 309, 30 Am. Dec. 263; Stevens v. Minneapolis F. D. R. Ass'n., 124 Minn. 381, 145 N. W. 35, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018; Hall v. Supreme Lodge, etc. (D. C.) 24 F. 450; Com. ex rel. v. Pike Ben. Soc., 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 251; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Eskholme, 59 N. J. Law, 255, 35 A. 1055, 59 Am. St. Rep. 609.
The learned author and jurist, Seymour D. Thompson, in referring to the authorities holding that one must first exhaust his remedies within the organization, in Mulroy v. Knights of Honor, 28 Mo. App. 463, said: "But all the cases which so hold either expressly state, or tacitly assume, that, in the action which the society took, and against which relief was sought, it acted within the scope of its powers, and in prosecuting their inquiries into the propriety of the action of such societies in the expulsion of members, or in the disposition of property, or otherwise, courts have in general proceeded no further than to inquire whether the judicatory provided by the laws of the society, which acted, had jurisdiction in the particular case."
Entertaining the views expressed, it follows that the judgment and order appealed from must be reversed, with instructions to the trial court to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
It is so ordered.
Ducker, C. J., I concur.