Ex Parte DENNIS DOYLE
Ex parte Doyle
Ex Parte DENNIS DOYLE.
[No. 1616.]
Ex Parte DENNIS DOYLE.
Criminal Law — Judgment—Recital of Offense — Sufficiency. A judgment reciting that defendant was informed of an indictment found against him for the crime of escaping from an officer, and that his plea of guilty was duly entered, and that it was adjudged that he be punished for the crime for which he had "pleaded guilty,” sufficiently stated the offense for which the conviction was had.
Application by Dennis Doyle for a writ of habeas corpus.
Writ dismissed.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
Ed. T. EuPuis, for Petitioner:
I. The judgment and the process of commitment issued thereon are void, for the reason that there is no statement defining the crime for which the prisoner was convicted, as required by Section 4415 of the Compiled Laws.
II. "There are two essentials to a valid judgment of conviction and a process of commitment issued thereon, namely, the statement defining the punishment, and the statement of the offense for which the punishment is inflicted.” {Ex parte Eelci, 25 Nev. 350.)
III. "A judgment in a criminal action must show the parties thereto, the court in which it was rendered, the terms of imprisonment and the offense for which the prisoner is to be punished.” {Ex parte Salge, 1 Nev. 453.)
IY. "Awarrant of commitment must set forth the offense With which the person is charged or of which he stands convicted, or he will be discharged on habeas corpus.” {Ex parte llhoe, 5 Ark. 104; Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158.)
Y. "A commitment must show the offense and a judgment in pursuance of the statute.” {Sipple v. Rodgers, 5 Harr. Del. 149.)
By the Court,
Massey, C. J.:
Dennis Doyle brings habeas corpus for his discharge from the state prison. He claims that his imprisonment is unlawful because the judgment of the district court sentencing him to imprisonment is void, in that it fails to state the offense for which he was convicted.
Tbe certified copy of tbe judgment set out in tbe warden's return, omitting tbe title of the court and tbe cause, is as follows: "Tbe time having arrived set by tbe court for passing sentence on tbe defendant, Dennis Doyle, tbe defendant is in court and tbe district attorney is in court. Tbe defendant was then informed by tbe court of an indictment having been found against him by tbe grand jury of Lincoln county, Nevada, on tbe 22d day of November, A. D. 1901, for tbe crime of escaping from an officer, and of bis arraignment on tbe 22d day of November, A. D. 1901, and of bis plea of guilty duly entered on tbe 30th day of November, A. D. 1901. Tbe defendant was then asked by tbe court why judgment should not be pronounced at this time. There being no legal cause appearing or being shown to the court why judgment should not be pronounced at this time, tbe court renders its judgment: It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that tbe defendant, Dennis Doyle, be punished for the crime to which you have pleaded guilty by being incarcerated in the state prison at Carson City, Nevada, for the period of two years. Tbe defendant is remanded to the custody of tbe sheriff."
Tbe petitioner bases bis claim to discharge upon tbe decision of this court in Dx parte Dela, 25 Nev. 316, 60 Pac. 217; but an examination of that case shows that there is a wide and marked difference between it and the ease at bar.
In tbe Dela case tbe jurisdiction of tbe court to render tbe particular judgment was directly attacked in tbe petition. It was shown by tbe petition that Dela was indicted and tried for tbe crime of murder, and upon tbe trial was convicted by tbe jury of- tbe crime of rape. A judgment was based upon, this verdict convicting him of rape, by which be was imprisoned for tbe crime of murder. Tbe recitals of tbe judgment did not show that be bad been convicted of rape, neither could such fact be inferred therefrom. An examination of that case will further show that tbe judgment did not even recite that Dela had been convicted of tbe crime of murder, but left that fact to be inferred from the recital that be bad been indicted for murder, and upon plea and trial there was a verdict of a jury.
It was therefore well said in that opinion, under tbe facts of that case, that "it appears from the judgment that the petitioner was convicted of some crime, but- it is left to be surmised what the crime is "; and it was proper to treat those recitals of a judgment as' mere matters of procedure, the omission of which could not affect the validity of the judgment, under the claim of the attorney-general that such recitals raised a presumption of the conviction of Dela for murder, and that such presumptions could not be impeached or contradicted.
It may be true that the language used by the justice who prepared the opinion in that case, in the discussion of these points, may not be as clear as it should, but the final conclusions of the court on page 355, 25 Nev., supra, show precisely what was decided under the facts of that record.
In the case at bar the petitioner was not convicted of the offense charged. It is shown by the judgment, and this fact is not even denied or attempted to be contradicted, that he entered a plea of guilty to the crime charged by the indictment, to wit, escaping from an officer, and upon his plea of guilty was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years.
It .clearly appears from the record in this proceeding that the judgment is not void for the want of any essential matter, and that the petitioner is detained by the warden by virtue of a final judgment of a competent court of criminal jurisdiction, and that the time during which the petitioner may be legally detained has not expired.
The petitioner will therefore be remanded to the custody of the warden., and the writ dismissed.
Let an order be entered accordingly.