THE STATE OF NEVADA, Petitioner, v. THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, DEPARTMENT I and THE HONORABLE DAVID R. GAMBLE, JUDGE, Respondent, and ALEJANDRO C., a Minor, Real Party in Interest
State v. Ninth Judicial District Court
Young, C. J., and Mowbray, J., concur.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, Petitioner, v. THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, DEPARTMENT I and THE HONORABLE DAVID R. GAMBLE, JUDGE, Respondent, and ALEJANDRO C., a Minor, Real Party in Interest.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, Petitioner, v. THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, DEPARTMENT I and THE HONORABLE DAVID R. GAMBLE, JUDGE, Respondent, and ALEJANDRO C., a Minor, Real Party in Interest.
No. 19350
November 2, 1989
781 P.2d 776
Brent Kolvet, District Attorney, Douglas County, for Petitioner.
Ronald J. Bath, Reno, for Respondent.
OPINION
By the Court,
Steffen, J.:
The sole issue presented by this original mandamus proceeding is whether NRS 62.080 empowers the juvenile court to certify and transfer to the adult criminal justice system minors sixteen years of age or older who commit felonious offenses prior to their sixteenth birthday. We hold that it does.
The minor whose conduct prompted these proceedings was approximately one month shy of his sixteenth birthday when he allegedly committed six serious offenses, each of which would have been a felony if committed by an adult. After an investigation, the State filed a petition alleging delinquency with the juvenile court on July 18, 1988. The petition charged the minor, Alejandro C., with sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, two counts of battery with intent to commit sexual assault, and two counts of burglary. Thereafter, on August 9, 1988, the State filed a motion pursuant to NRS 62.080 to certify Alejandro C. for trial as an adult. The juvenile judge denied the State's motion on grounds that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to certify a minor for offenses committed before age sixteen. The State subsequently challenged the ruling of the juvenile court by filing a petition for writ of mandamus in this court.
As a general rule, courts are enjoined to construe statutory language so "as to give effect to, rather than nullify, an act of the legislature." State ex rel. Kaufman v. Martin, 31 Nev. 493, 499, 103 P. 840, 842 (1909). The operative phrase used by the legislature in conferring certification jurisdiction on the juvenile court consists of the words "is charged with." Paraphrasing the key language, if a juvenile "16 years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult" the juvenile court may either retain jurisdiction or transfer the child to the adult criminal system (emphasis ours). If the legislature had intended to limit certification proceedings to juveniles who commit felonious offenses after reaching age sixteen, it would have so provided.
Although the language of the statute is clear, the eventual resolution of this proceeding was delayed as a result of internal debate and concern over the possibility that a frank recognition of the statutory language would facilitate prosecutorial manipulation of the juvenile justice system by merely sitting back and waiting for a youth's sixteenth birthday before charging him or her with an offense committed at an earlier age. Ultimately, and with due respect for the views of the dissenting justice, we concluded that there are substantial safeguards in place to minimize, if not eliminate, such a contingency.
The statute provides that a juvenile judge may not exercise his or her discretion on the issue of certification until after a full investigation. Once the investigation is complete, the juvenile judge has the discretion to reject the State's request for certification and to retain jurisdiction over the juvenile offender. And the judge is expected to appropriately weigh unpersuasive efforts by the prosecution to explain substantial delays in dealing with a juvenile chargeable with serious offenses. Moreover, we have provided the juvenile court with extensive guidelines to assist in determining whether to transfer a child to the adult criminal system. See In the Matter of Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947 (1983). We are confident that our juvenile judges will give careful consideration to those guidelines in reaching a decision regarding certification. If, after analyzing the results of the "full investigation" required by the statute and applying the guidelines specified in Seven Minors, the juvenile judge abuses his discretion, this court remains as an additional safety valve to prevent unwarranted prosecutions of juveniles in adult criminal proceedings.
The statute as enacted by the legislature provides a desirable flexibility in the handling of youthful offenders. In Seven Minors, we observed that "the transfer process is based upon the sound idea that there is no arbitrary age at which all youths should be held fully responsible as adults for their criminal acts and that there should be a transition period during which an offender may or may not be held criminally liable, depending on the nature of the offender and the offense." Id. at 99 Nev. 430, 664 P.2d 949 (footnote omitted). Thus, in a given case, a juvenile judge may determine that a minor who has committed a serious offense at age fifteen, but who was-not identified as the offender until shortly before or sometime after age sixteen, may fully satisfy the criteria for certification. In other cases involving the same or similar age components, the juvenile judge may determine that the complex of factors impacting the youthful miscreant and the demands of society warrants retention of the minor in the juvenile justice system.
Giving effect to the literal language of the statute is also consonant with Nevada law that makes children between the ages of eight and fourteen years subject to criminal accountability and punishment if there is clear proof that such children knew the wrongfulness of their offenses at the time they were committed. Logically, then, certification proceedings should at least be theoretically available where felonious offenses have been committed by eight-year-olds who are identified as the perpetrator shortly before or sometime after their sixteenth birthday. Although petitions for certification of sixteen-year-olds who committed their offenses at age eight would be so rare as to approach historical nonoccurrence, petitions against minors who committed their felonious offenses as physically strong, violent fifteen-year-olds could, in today's world, be anticipated with frightening frequency.
Moreover, the statutory language and scheme selected by the legislature is responsive to trends in juvenile crime. States are reducing the age of minors certifiable to criminal courts for felonious crimes. The Appendix to § 4.10 of the Model Penal Code & Commentaries (1985) reflects that children committing serious crimes (i.e., felonies) are transferable to criminal courts in at least thirty-four states at ages varying between thirteen and fifteen years. Only eight states restrict waiver to children committing crimes after their sixteenth birthday. Such trends among the states are hardly surprising given the fact that persons under the age of eighteen commit approximately twenty percent of the violent crime and forty-four percent of serious property crimes nationwide. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session on S. 829, p. 551 (1983). Moreover, according to statistics covering the year 1979, minors under the age of fifteen committed 206 homicides, in excess of 1,000 forcible rapes and more than 10,000 robberies and 10,000 aggravated assaults. Id. at 554 (citing the United States Department of Justice, Source-book of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1981).
Finally, we are confident that if the legislature intended to limit the availability of transfer proceedings to minors who have committed felonious offenses at age sixteen or older, it will be prompted by this decision to amend the statute accordingly. Because the language of the existing statute is clear and provides a reasonable, flexible scheme for dealing with juveniles involved in the commission of serious offenses we are unwilling to alter the scope and effect of the statute in the name of statutory construction.
In light of the above, we conclude that petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus is justified. Accordingly, the clerk of this court shall issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate the State's petition to certify Alejandro C. for trial as an adult pursuant to NRS 62.080 and to decide the petition in accordance with the procedure specified in this opinion.
Young, C. J., and Mowbray, J., concur.
NRS 62.080 provides:
If a child 16 years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile division of the district court, after full investigation, may in its discretion retain jurisdiction or certify the child for proper criminal proceedings to any court which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; but no child under 16 years of age may be so certified. After such a child has been certified for proper criminal proceedings and his case has been transferred out of the juvenile division, original jurisdiction of the person rests with the court to which the child has been certified and the child may thereafter petition for transfer back to the juvenile division only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
NRS 194.010, in pertinent part, reads:
Persons capable of committing crimes. All persons are liable to punishment except those belonging to the following classes.
1. Children under the age of 8 years.
2. Children between the ages of 8 years and 14 years, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them they knew its wrongfulness.
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.
The Honorable Robert E. Rose, Justice, did not participate in the decision of this appeal.