AFTERCARE OF CLARK COUNTY, a Nevada Corporation; AFTERCARE OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and MICHAEL MULLINS, Appellants, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; and ERIC LEHY, Respondents; WILLIAM ROPER, Appellant, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; SOLIDAD RAMIREZ and IMELDA IZQUIERDO, Respondents
Aftercare of Clark County v. Justice Court of Las Vegas Township ex rel. County of Clark
AFTERCARE OF CLARK COUNTY, a Nevada Corporation; AFTERCARE OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and MICHAEL MULLINS, Appellants, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; and ERIC LEHY, Respondents. WILLIAM ROPER, Appellant, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; SOLIDAD RAMIREZ and IMELDA IZQUIERDO, Respondents.
AFTERCARE OF CLARK COUNTY, a Nevada Corporation; AFTERCARE OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and MICHAEL MULLINS, Appellants, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; and ERIC LEHY, Respondents. WILLIAM ROPER, Appellant, v. THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP in and for THE COUNTY OF CLARK; THE HONORABLE JENNIFER TOGLIATTI, Justice of the Peace; SOLIDAD RAMIREZ and IMELDA IZQUIERDO, Respondents.
No. 38625
No. 38626
January 23, 2004
82 P.3d 931
Lemons Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg and Tiffinay Barker Pagni, Reno; William C. Turner & Associates and Michael P. Golden, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Albert D. Massi, P.C., and Allen A. Cap and Donald C. Kudler, Las Vegas, for Respondents Solidad Ramirez and Imelda Izquierdo.
David J. Roger, District Attorney, and Robert J. Gower, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent Justice Court.
Mainor Harris and W. Randall Mainor, Las Vegas, for Respondent Eric Lehy.
OPINION
Per Curiam:
In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether justices of the peace may deny jury trials to litigants who have filed a civil action in justice's court, rather than a small claims action, and seek less than $5,000. The Las Vegas Township Justice's Court has implemented a policy denying jury trials to litigants unless $5,000 or more is at stake. The district court declined to issue extraordinary relief compelling justice's court jury trials for the appellants, who are the defendants in two justice's court civil actions, both involving less than $5,000. Because we conclude that the justice's court's policy violates the Nevada constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, we reverse the district court's orders denying extraordinary relief, and we remand, these matters to the district court for the issuance of writs of mandamus, compelling justice's court jury trials in these cases.
FACTS
In 1999, the Las Vegas Township Justice's Court adopted a policy allowing jury trials only when the plaintiff's alleged special damages are $5,000 or more. The district court approved the policy, stating that the policy would "preserve judicial resources."
In 2000, respondents Solidad Ramirez and Imelda Izquierdo filed a justice's court civil action against appellant William Roper for damages arising from an automobile accident. In 2001, respondent Eric Lehy commenced a justice's court civil action against ap pellants Aftercare of Clark County, Aftercare of Nevada, Inc., and Michael Mullins for damages arising from a separate automobile .accident. The appellants filed jury trial demands and deposited the required jury fees. Nevertheless, the justice's court scheduled bench trials in both cases because the respondents each sought less than $5,000 in special damages. The appellants then sought extraordinary relief from the district court. Unsuccessful, appellants then appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Nevada Constitution secures to all the right of trial by jury, and provides that the right shall remain inviolate forever. This court has consistently stated that the constitutional right applies as it did under the common law in existence when the Nevada Constitution was adopted in 1864. Although this statement is technically correct, it does not completely depict Nevada's jury trial right. Our case law suggests a more precise definition, in line with federal and out-of-state case law, as well as scholarly commentary. We now clarify our statement: Nevada's jury trial right is defined by English common law as modified at the time of the Nevada Constitution's adoption. With the statement clarified, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying writ relief from the justice's court's policy requiring bench trials in civil actions under $5,000.
A historical approach to construing the jury trial right appears to be universal in federal and state courts. To determine the reach of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, federal courts look to jury trial practice in 1791 England, the year in which the amendment was ratified. The Seventh Amendment does not, how ever, apply to the states. Consequently, most states look to the jury trial practice in their own territory or colony prior to statehood, in addition to the English practice, recognizing that the course of the common law may have been modified by territorial or colonial statute.
A slightly broader approach is found within our case law. For instance, in State v. Steward, the issue was whether Steward's jury trial right was infringed when he was tried in a county other than the county in which the crime was actually committed. We concluded that the jury trial right was not connected to "ancient [English] common law," but rather, to English common law as modified by English or "state" statute prior to the Nevada Constitution's adoption. And in Ex Parte Sloan, we looked favorably to a Colorado case, McInerney v. City of Denver, and held that adoption of the Nevada Constitution did not change the practice " 'in this country and in England' " that violations of municipal ordinances could be tried without a jury. Significantly, the McInerney court indicated that the practice "in this country and in England" was based on the "common or statutory law [existing] before the adoption" of the Colorado Constitution. As recently as 1965, in Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, we invoked McInerney to again tie Nevada's jury trial right to the jury trial practice " 'in this country and in England.' ' '
Thus, Nevada's jury trial right is based on an 1864 version of the English common law as statutorily modified in this country. This view is consistent with the framers' use of "shall remain inviolate" to perpetuate the jury trial right as it was understood when the Nevada Constitution was adopted.
Regarding the 1864 English common law, the parties disagree regarding the minimum threshold amount for jury trials and whether that amount is subject to inflation. But we need not reach those issues. In 1861, Nevada's first territorial legislature removed any monetary threshold altogether, mandating a jury trial in justice's court for issues of fact, unless waived. The concern for jury-decision of fact issues was not unique to Nevada. Seventy years earlier, the same concern prompted the addition of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Undoubtedly aware of that amendment, Nevada's territorial legislature crafted a jury trial guarantee, but without the twenty-dollar threshold imposed by the Seventh Amendment. Even the fact that Utah, from which the Nevada territory was carved, copied the Seventh Amendment's monetary threshold into a statute was not enough to sway our territorial legislature from designing a jury trial right unencumbered by a monetary threshold.
The territorial legislature's statutory design endured throughout the Constitutional Convention of 1864, as the jury trial guarantee emerged without discussion of a minimum monetary threshold. Even the specific constitutional provision governing justice's court jurisdiction survived scrutiny by delegates without mention of any monetary minimum for jury trials. In fact, when debating whether justices' courts should have jurisdiction over claims up to $300 in value or involving real property, one of the delegates, who was in favor of justice's court jurisdiction limited only by the sum of $300, suggested that the right of trial by jury and appeal would ensure the proper treatment of real property claims up to the value of $300:
Now the question resolves itself into this: Is it safe, or is it not, for a man to go before a Justice of the Peace, with the right of trial by jury, which men will certainly have in all cases, to have anything tried in his court affecting either real or personal property, where the value does not exceed three hundred dollars? . If we can feel safe in going into a Justice's Court to try an amount of three hundred dollars, with the right of trial by jury, and the subsequent right of appeal, then in my opinion, this proposed amendment [providing justices' courts with jurisdiction over all claims up to $300, including real property claims] is a good one.
Although the delegates ultimately excluded from justice's court jurisdiction claims involving title to real property, they did so because real property might quickly appreciate beyond the $300 jurisdictional limit and require the resolution of difficult issues, but not because of any perceived limitation on the jury trial right in justice's court.
The delegates' omission of a minimum monetary threshold for justice's court jury trials was consistent with the territorial legislature's edict and with statutes in other states. For instance, California, which provided the predicate for the Nevada Constitution, had not imposed a threshold amount for jury trials in justice's court. And New York, which influenced the drafters of the California Constitution, "uniformly . . . allow[ed] a jury trial even in causes under forty shillings [the eighteenth century English common-law threshold for juryless proceedings]."
Thus, we conclude that the Nevada constitutional guaranty of trial by jury covers justice's court civil actions even when small amounts are in controversy. A different conclusion may be warranted, however, for justice's court small claims actions. But the instant actions were not commenced as small claims actions.. And the Iowa case cited by the respondent Justice's Court and Justice of the Peace in support of the $5,000 jury trial threshold, Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, involved a proceeding commenced under Iowa's Small Claims Act. In contrast to Nevada, an Iowa plaintiff who seeks recovery of a small monetary sum ($5,000 or less) is confined to seeking relief in a small claims proceeding. But in Nevada, the same plaintiff could commence in justice's court either a small claims action or a civil action. Mitchell's reasoning that a jury trial may be withheld in a small claims proceeding "in the interests of cost to the parties, time constraints, and judicial resources" is not entirely convincing in a Nevada justice's court civil action, which is not designed to be "simple and informal." Withholding a jury trial in a civil action pursuant to the justice's court's policy merely creates a hybrid small claims court, which conducts juryless proceedings like its 1923 legislatively-created relative, but which maintains most of the litigation formalities customary in regular civil proceedings, such as pleading practice and discovery. Such a hybrid court bears little resemblance to common-law small claims courts, which traded valuable, but often complex and expensive practices, including the right to trial by jury, in exchange for cheap and efficient legal solutions to minor monetary disputes.
CONCLUSION
Because the Las Vegas Township Justice's Court's policy violates the Nevada constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, we reverse the district court orders that denied appellants' petitions for writ relief, and we remand these cases to the district court for the issuance of writs of mandamus, compelling justice's court jury trials in these cases.
Mandamus, rather than prohibition, is the appropriate remedy "to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." NRS 34.160; see also NRS 34.320 (providing that a writ of prohibition is available to stop extra-jurisdictional judicial proceedings).
The respondent Justice's Court and Justice of the Peace assert in their answering brief that the policy allows jury trials only when special damages are more than $5,000 — rather than $5,000 or more — and that the policy complements NRS 73.010's limitation of small claims actions to $5,000 or less. But that assertion is belied by the record. At least four documents in the record, including the 1999 policy declaration, provide that the threshold "amount for the granting of a jury trial will be the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or more."
Watier v. Justice's Court, No. A397046 (8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 1999) (Order Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition).
See JCRCP 38.
Nev. Const, art. 1, § 3.
E.g., Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 81 Nev. 677, 409 P.2d 245 (1965); Wainwright v. Bartlett, Judge, 51 Nev. 170, 271 P. 689 (1928).
See DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000) (stating that "[a] district court's decision to grant or deny a writ petition is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard").
See Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A Historical Exception for Small Monetaty Claims, 39 Hastings L.J. 125, 130-33 (1987).
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. Const, amend VII.
In re Air Crash Disaster near Roselawn, Ind., 96 F.3d 932, 943 (7th Cir. 1996).
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).
See Barrett, supra note 9, at 131; e.g., Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Idaho 2000); People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Ill. 1988); Bell v. State, 176 N.W. 544, 544 (Neb. 1920); Gonzales v. Lopez, 52 P.3d 418, 422 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Unemployment Comp. Com'n v. J. M. Willis B. & B. Shop, 15 S.E.2d 4, 7 (N.C. 1941); Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Or. 1995); White v. White, 196 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. 1917); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 718 (Wash. 1989). But see Keeter v. State, 198 P. 866, 872 (Okla. 1921) (declaring that Oklahoma's jury trial right "was not predicated upon the statutes existing in the territory at [the time of the Oklahoma Constitution's adoption], but upon the right of the citizen, as the same was guaranteed under the federal Constitution and according to the course of the common law").
74 Nev. 65, 323 P.2d 23 (1958).
Id. at 73, 323 P.2d at 26.
47 Nev. 109, 217 P. 233 (1923), abrogated on other grounds by Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
29 P. 516 (Colo. 1892), abrogated on other grounds by Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
Ex Parte Sloan, 47 Nev at 119, 217 P. at 237 (quoting McInerney, 29 P. at 519).
29 P. at 520.
81 Nev 677, 409 P.2d 245 (1965) (determining that a defendant could be tried in municipal court without a jury trial even though a similar charge in justice's court required a jury trial).
Id. at 681, 409 P.2d at 247 (quoting McInerney, 29 P. at 519).
See Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1118 (stating that, "by employing the phrase 'shall remain inviolate,' the [Idaho Constitution's] Framers must have intended to perpetuate the right as it existed" "at the common law and under the territorial statutes when the Idaho Constitution was adopted" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
English practice around the year 1791 focused on the sum of forty shillings. Barrett, supra note 9, at 145-49. By the early 1800s, the threshold for juryless trials in England had increased to five pounds. Id. at 161 n. 172.
See 1861 Nev. Laws, ch. 103, § 155, at 339 (stating generally that "[a]n issue of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived"); id. § 527, at 404 (stating that, injustice's court, "[a] jury trial shall be demanded at the time of joining issue"); id. § 648-50, at 424 (authorizing justice's court jury trials in landlord-tenant disputes).
U.S. Const. amend VII; see Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27, 67-69 (2003) (noting the Anti-Federalist concern that, without a constitutional jury-trial guarantee, "federal judges would emulate the English example and invade the rights of litigants to present their cases to juries"); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) ("At the time when the constitution was submitted to the people for adoption, one of the most powerful objections urged against it was, that in civil causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury.").
1852 Utah Laws, ch. 3, § 11, at 134 (withholding jury trials unless "the sum in question exceeded] twenty dollars").
See Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 53-59 (Andrew J. Marsh off. rep., 1866).
See id. at 678-92.
Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added) (statement of delegate Lloyd Frizell).
Id. at 685 (statement of delegate Cornelius M. Brosnan, stating that "one of the most complicated branches of legal science is that which relates to the investigation of title to real property, and it makes no difference whether such property be of small or of great value"); id. at 687 (statement of delegate Charles E. DeLong, questioning the procedure to be followed when real property in litigation has appreciated beyond $300 during an appeal from the justice's court and the appellate court intends to remand for a new trial).
Id. at 17 (statement of delegate Neely J. Johnson, observing that "the Constitution of California was adopted as the basis of action of the [1863 Constitutional] Convention"); id. at 24 (providing that "the Constitution framed by the Convention of 1863 was adopted as a basis" for consideration at the 1864 Constitutional Convention); see also Michael W. Bowers, The Nevada State Constitution 1 (1993) (stating that "most" of the 1864 delegates were from California).
See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 3 (1849) ("The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever . . . ."); id. art. 6, § 9 ("The Legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected in each city and township of the State, and fix by law their powers, duties and responsibilities . . . ."); 1851 Cal. Laws, ch. 5, § 155, at 74 (stating generally that an issue of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless waived); id. § 587, at 144 (providing that a jury trial injustice's court is waived unless demanded at the time of "joining issue"); 1863 Cal. Laws, ch. 405, § 29, at 638 (providing that either party to a justice's court action may demand a jury before the trial's commencement); see also Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, 215 P. 391, 393 (Cal. 1923) (stating that, under California's Small Claims Act of 1921, a plaintiff with a claim less than $50 may either proceed to a trial before the justice of the peace or "follow the customary procedure and demand a Jury" (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
Golden Gateway v. Tenants Association, 29 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001).
Comment, Legislation: Small Claims Courts, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 932, 939 n.58 (1934); see also 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., Part 3, ch. 2, title 4, art. 7, § 83 (1859) ("After issue joined, and before the justice shall proceed to an investigation of the merits of the cause, by an examination of a witness or the hearing of any other testimony, either of the parties, or the attorney of either of them, may demand of the justice that the cause be tried by a jury.").
305 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1981).
Iowa Code Ann. § 631.1(1) & 631.8(3) (West Supp. 2003).
See JCRCP 2 (designating three forms of action injustice's court; civil actions, small claims actions, and summary eviction actions).
305 N.W.2d at 728.
. Id. at 725 (citing Iowa Code Ann. § 631.11(1)).
1923 Nev. Stat., ch. 149, § 1, at 260-64.
Compare JCRCP 88 (stating that a small claims action is commenced by affidavit), and JCRCP 96 (providing for "informal" resolution of small claims actions), with JCRCP 7(a) (designating civil action pleadings, including complaints and answers), and JCRCP 26(a) (listing civil action discovery mechanisms, including depositions, interrogatories and physical and mental examinations).
See Barrett, supra note 9, at 125-27.