NAPOLEAN HOLYFIELD, JR. and DUANE NARVELL TOWNSELL, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
Holyfield v. State
Springer, C. J., concurs.
NAPOLEAN HOLYFIELD, JR. and DUANE NARVELL TOWNSELL, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
NAPOLEAN HOLYFIELD, JR. and DUANE NARVELL TOWNSELL, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
No. 13967
December 20, 1985
711 P.2d 834
Samuel T Bull, Reno, for Appellants.
Brian McKay, Attorney General, Carson City; Mills Lane, District Attorney, Edward B. Horn, Deputy, Washoe County, for Respondent.
OPINION
By the Court,
Gunderson, J.:
In this consolidated appeal, the central issue is whether police officers may subvert a suspect's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution and article 1 section 8 of the Nevada Constitution by bargaining to have a self-interested, twice-convicted felon and escapee conduct a custodial interrogation that the police could not lawfully conduct themselves. We hold they may not do so. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm appellant Townsell's judgment of conviction, but we reverse the conviction of appellant Holyfield.
The convictions of Holyfield and Townsell stem from an armed robbery at the Sierra Schools Credit Union in Reno on July 16, 1980. On that morning, two young black men entered the credit union brandishing handguns. After taking $6,700 in cash from the tellers' drawers, the robbers confined the credit union employees and a customer in a vault. As they fled, the robbers encountered the credit union's manager in the parking lot. They took her purse, papers, and a banking bag containing a deposit slip in the amount of $20,000. Then, they forced her into the trunk of her car where she remained for two hours.
Earlier that morning, at around 9:30 a.m., a witness driving by the credit union had observed three black males, wearing colored bandanas, sitting in a gold Chrysler automobile parked near the credit union. At approximately 11:20 a.m., the witness again drove by and noticed the same Chrysler. The Chrysler, still carrying three black men, pulled sharply in front of the witness into his lane of traffic, and ran two stop signs. The witness followed the car for some distance and, believing that the occupants were acting suspiciously, recorded the vehicle's license number. After reading about the robbery in the newspaper the next day, the witness reported his observations to the police.
Although the police determined that the vehicle was registered to Townsell' they allegedly could not locate the vehicle until two weeks later, on August 1, when it was being driven not by Townsell but by Holyfield. The police stopped the vehicle and arrested Holyfield on an outstanding warrant for an unrelated robbery of a Sparks movie theatre. The police siezed Holyfield's glasses because, although they differed in color, they were similar in shape to glasses that reportedly had been worn by one of the robbers of the credit union. Holyfield was subsequently taken to the Sparks Police Department, given his Miranda warnings, and questioned directly by the police about the credit union robbery. Holyfield denied any involvement in the credit union robbery.
While Holyfield was in custody in the Sparks City Jail, the Reno police detectives investigating the credit union robbery enlisted the aid of a long-time criminal and former San Quentin inmate named Obbie Jacobs, alias "George Shaw," who had a history of serving as an informant or "fink" to purchase favorable treatment for himself, and who was then residing in the Washoe County Jail. On or about August 24, 1980, police detectives placed Jacobs in the jail cell with Holyfield, admittedly to obtain incriminating statements about both the cinema robbery for which Holyfield had been arrested, and about the credit union robbery of which they had concluded Holyfield was also guilty. Upon exiting the cell the next day, Jacobs immediately related to the detectives his version of the statements Holyfield had allegedly made to him concerning both the cinema robbery and the credit union robbery. According to Jacobs, Holyfield admitted that he and two others had committed the credit union robbery. After receiving Jacobs' taped statement, on August 28 Reno police formally arrested Holyfield, who was still in jail, for the credit union robbery. It was not until September 18, 1980, however, that both Holyfield and Townsell were formally charged with burglary, two counts each of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and two counts each of kidnapping for the credit union incident. Holyfield was also charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a concealed firearm.
At trial, none of the six victims of the robbery or any other witness was able to identify Holyfield or Townsell as the perpetrators of the credit union robbery. Nor were any of these individuals able to identify Holyfield and Townsell in any of the pretrial lineups. Consequently, without any direct evidence, the state was forced to rely in large part upon Jacobs' testimony and upon that of three other witnesses, two of them convicted felons, who were acquainted with appellants.
For example, Michael King, an ex-felon on probation, testified that on August 20, 1980, he gave a taped statement to the Reno police detectives following his arrest for a different offense. King told the police that he had a conversation with Townsell in August. According to King, he saw Townsell with about $5,000, and Townsell admitted to King that he and another person had robbed the credit union and fled with a third accomplice. King further described to the police the details of the robbery as allegedly related to him by Townsell. Additionally, according to King, Townsell stated that he left the Reno area because he knew police were looking for him for the credit union robbery and knew his car had been impounded. Interestingly, none of Town-sell's statements to King implicated Holyfield.
The jury subsequently found Holyfield and Townsell quilty of all the counts charged. This appeal followed.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by refusing to suppress Jacobs' testimony concerning the incriminating statements Holyfield allegedly made to Jacobs while the two were confined in jail. Specificially, appellants contend that admission of this evidence violated Holyfield's constitutional right against self-incrimination because Jocobs was, in fact, an agent of the police and he had not advised Holyfield of his Miranda rights prior to speaking with him. We agree.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inclupatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The ruling of Miranda applies to statements taken during a "custodial interrogation," which the Court defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 478 (footnote omitted). As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, Miranda requires that prior to questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to have an attorney present, and that one will be appointed for him if he cannot afford one. Id. at 479. Because it is conceded that Holyfield was not given any of these warnings before he was subjected to inquiry by Jacobs, the issue presented is whether Holyfield's alleged admissions were the product of custodial interrogation initiated by the police.
We note initially that, although Holyfield was incarcerated on other charges at the time he allegedly made the incriminating statements to Jacobs, he was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). As the Court in Mathis concluded, nothing in the Miranda opinion makes the necessity for warnings dependent on the particular reason the defendant is in custody. Id. at 4-5. As soon as a person is incarcerated for any reason, he must be given his Miranda warnings before he is interrogated. Therefore, we conclude, and the state concedes as much, that Holyfield was indeed "in custody" for purposes of Miranda when Jacobs conversed with him.
Second, there is no doubt that Jacobs, upon agreeing to foster police efforts to inculpate Holyfield, became an agent of the police. Police detectives placed Jacobs in the jail cell with Holy-field, admittedly to seek incriminating statements about both the robbery for which Holyfield had been arrested and the credit union robbery of which he was suspected. Although the prosecution maintains that the police instructed Jacobs not to question Holyfield, the prosecution has conceded that the police in fact expected him to do so, and that Jacobs knew he was expected to elicit information from Holyfield. The only question that remains, then, is whether Jacobs' conversation with Holyfield amounted to interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
The state maintains that Holyfield was not subjected to police interrogation, for several reasons. First, the state contends that Holyfield was not questioned by any figure of authority. Second, the state contends, there was no environment or atmosphere which in any way could be described as intimidating or coercive because Jacobs and Holyfield conversed in a dormitory cell which housed twelve other inmates. The state argues that Holy-field did not have to talk to Jacobs; he could have simply walked away. Third, the state contends that the police instructed Jacobs not to ask Holyfield any direct questions or attempt to initiate an interview with him. Fourth, the state argues that the police did not give Jacobs any details concerning the credit union robbery and, therefore, Jacobs was not in a position to elicit admissions from Holyfield. For the reasons discussed below, we reject these contentions.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court held that "interrogation" under Miranda need not amount to actual questioning and may instead be the "functional equivalent" of such questioning. The Court defined the latter to include "any words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 300 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
In the present case, the state concedes that Jacobs was acting as an agent of the police, that police deliberately placed Jacobs in Holyfield's cell in the hope of gaining incriminating testimony concerning Holyfield's assumed involvement in the credit union robbery, and that, since Jacobs and Holyfield were previously acquainted, it was plausible Holyfield would talk to Jacobs about the robberies he had committed. Moreover, it appears from the testimony of another witness, Roy Joshua, who had been a prisoner in the cell contemporaneously with Jacobs and Holy-field, that Jacobs performed as the police contemplated by repeatedly asking Holyfield questions about the credit union and cinema robberies, but that he never heard Holyfield mention the credit union robbery in response.
It is disingenuous to argue, as the state does here, that Jacobs did not interrogate Holyfield simply because Jacobs was allegedly "instructed" not to question Holyfield directly about the robbery. As we have noted, the police fully expected Jacobs to question Holyfield and Jacobs himself knew what the police expected. We conclude, therefore, that Jacobs' conversation with Holyfield was the functional equivalent of express police questioning for purposes of Miranda under the test set forth above.
The record also refutes the state's suggestion that Jacobs could not have "interrogated" Holyfield because he had no prior information about the robberies. Jacobs had access to information concerning the credit union robbery because he was in Washoe County Jail with Michael King on August 20, 1980, the same day King reportedly gave Reno police detectives a taped statement concerning Townsell's involvement in the credit union robbery. Jacobs testified at trial that he received information from King about an unrelated crime and he went to Detectives Eubanks and Kimpton with this information. Jacobs, then, could have received information from King concerning the credit union robbery as well. Thus, Jacobs was in a position to elicit admissions or information concerning the credit union robbery from Holyfield. Likewise, he was in a postition to fabricate a story of alleged admissions by Holyfield, which would satisfy the police and earn favorable consideration for himself.
Nor are we persuaded by the state's contention that Holyfield was not subjected to an intimidating or coercive atmosphere in the jail cell. As one commentator has noted,
'[m]ere confinement might increase a suspect's anxiety, and he is likely to seek discourse with others to relieve his anxiety. That search, of course, may make him more susceptible to an undercover investigator seeking information about the offense for which the suspect has been arrested.' Confinement of the suspect increases the power of the police in an important respect. Because the suspect's ability to select people with whom he can confide is completely within their control, the police have a unique opportunity to exploit the suspect's vulnerability. In short, the police can insure that if the pressures of confinement lead the suspect to confide in anyone, it will be a police agent. In view of the government's control over the suspect's channels of communication, it is blatantly unfair to allow the government to exploit the suspect's vulnerability by trickery of this type.
White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, U.Pa.L.Rev. 581, 605 (1979) (footnotes omitted); see also U.S. v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 Tex.L.Rev. 203, 230 (1975) (suggesting that a Miranda-type barrier should preclude use of the "jail-plant" tactic).
Under these circumstances, many jurisdictions have applied the requirements of Miranda notwithstanding the fact that a figure of authority did not conduct the interrogation. For example, in State v. Fuller, 281 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1979), a defendant confined in prison on unrelated charges was suspected of murdering a fellow prisoner. One of his cellmates agreed to cooperate with the prison authorities and attempt to induce the defendant to discuss his role in the inmate's death. The cellmate claimed to have succeeded, but the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the defendant's purported statements were inadmissible. "Since [the cellmate] was acting as a police agent, this was custodial interrogation and the defendant was entitled to the warnings required" by Miranda. Id. at 749.
In Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1971), Hamilton was arrested for burglary and was taken to a police station. At the time of his arrest, the police suspected Hamilton of having committed an unrelated murder. He was not advised of his rights under Miranda. Nevertheless, the police confronted Hamilton with his suspected accomplice, admittedly for the purpose of obtaining an incriminating statement from Hamilton. The individual accused Hamilton of being the triggerman in the crime; Hamilton sat mute for thirty seconds, and then proceeded to give an inculpatory statement. Stating that "a person whose freedom is restrained and who is a suspect must first be apprised of his constitutional rights prior to the initiation of any form of official interrogation be it direct or conducted indirectly through the offices of a third party," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Hamilton's statement inadmissible. Id. at 175. As the court noted, "[t]o sanction this technique without proper warnings would be to place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda that a suspect in custody should be clearly advised of his rights before any attempt is made to induce him to speak." Id. See also Commonwealth v. Bordner, 247, A.2d 612, 617 (Pa. 1968) (incriminating statements made to his mother by an accused, who was confined in the hospital under police guard and who had not been advised of his Miranda rights, were inadmissible; "the circumstances reveal a plan on the part of the police authorities to use the mother as a police instrumentality in the interrogation of the accused son").
Similarly, in Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973), the defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated charge. The Alaska Supreme Court held that a private investigator, who was working closely with police on an arson investigation, who had promised to give police any statements he obtained, and who had obtained access to the defendant through the police, was required to administer the Miranda warnings to the defendant before questioning him. Cf. People v. Whitt, 685 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1984) (absent evidence of complicity on the part of law enforcement officials, admissions or statements made by one prison inmate to another inmate infringed no constitutional guarantees); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. 1975), cert. den., 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
Again, in State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1976), a police agent — longhaired, handcuffed, and dressed in "modtype" clothing — was led into the jail cellblock, where his handcuffs were removed and the agent was placed in the suspect's cell. The agent later claimed that, after he conversed with the suspect to put him at ease, the suspect made several statements amounting to a confession. On the basis of these alleged statements, the suspect was charged and convicted. As in the instant case, the state argued that the defendant's statements had not been compelled but, rather, had been volunteered freely and, therefore, were admissible in evidence. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held, as we do, that the ruse employed by the police offended their state's constitution as well as the federal constitution, stating:
We attach no significance as to whether the agent in the cell asked questions of the duped defendant or not. [Citations omitted.] To allow into evidence admissions made to an agent in the cell who made casual conversation with a defendant while carefully avoiding any questions regarding the specific crime under investigation, but to disallow that agent's testimony if he asked a question pertaining to a defendant's reason for being incarcerated, would be to play games with an individual's constitutional guarantees. . . .
The police were not allowed to interrogate defendant directly. There is no authority in these circumstances for the police to do indirectly what they may not do directly. [Citations and footnote omitted.] The police conduct here nullified defendant's privilege against compelled self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Constitution of Rhode Island, art. 1, § 13, and the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 551. We therefore reject the state's contention that Miranda applies only to those situations in which a figure of authority directly interrogates an accused.
It is simply not enough to attempt to ascertain mechanically what police-initiated "interrogation" means without considering the rationale underlying the Miranda decision and the Fifth Amendment. The Court in Miranda emphasized that warnings were necessary to help aid the truth-finding function in a criminal proceeding, and to assure trustworthiness and accuracy in the reporting of a defendant's statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 470. As the Court noted, a defendant must be advised of his right to have counsel present, because the presence of counsel mitigates the dangers of untrustworthiness, and helps to "guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial." Id.
The present case graphically illustrates the importance of Miranda warnings in aiding the truth-finding function. Here, Jacobs, the police informant who interrogated appellant, was a twice-convicted felon, an escapee, and a former San Quentin inmate who was clearly acting in his own self-interest when he agreed to seek incriminating statements from appellant. Any report Jacobs made to the police was therefore of a suspect nature. Further, because the conversation took place without any procedural safeguards, there is no assurance that Holyfield made the statements Jacobs attributes to him. In fact, as noted above, one cellmate testified that no such statements were made. Accordingly, this important function of the Miranda warnings was clearly subverted by the police practice in this case.
As the Court noted in Miranda, "[0]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. . In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' " Id. at 460, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). In the present case, Holyfield's alleged statements were not given through a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, but instead were the questionable product of an intentional subversion of those rights.
The procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda are the only established means to protect a defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment and under article 1 section 8 of the Nevada Constitution. We therefore cannot permit the police to subvert these important constitutional rights by engaging in the surreptitious tactics used in this case. To do so would in effect render a defendant's substantive rights under our state and federal constitutions wholly meaningless.
Finally, the state alternatively contends that even if Holyfield's Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admission of Jacob's testimony, we should conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). With regard to appellant Holyfield, we disagree. Absent Jacobs' testimony, the evidence presented against Holyfield was not in any way overwhelming. In particular, no direct evidence existed implicating Holyfield, and none of the six victims was able to identify Holyfield as one of the perpetrators of the robberies. We have no doubt that the jury's verdict of guilt in Holyfield's case rested in large part upon the admission of Jacobs' self-interested statements. Accordingly, we cannot say that a jury would have found Holyfield guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without Jacobs' testimony.
Appellant Townsell contends that admission of Jacobs' testimony that Holyfield "told me the car [used in the robbery] belonged to a man named Duane Townsell" violated Townsell's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine his accusers because Holyfield chose not to testify at trial. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Before Jacobs testified, however, both King (who testified that Townsell had admitted his car was used in the robbery) and another witness (who testified that he followed the car from the credit union and recorded its license plate number) had been on the stand. Given this evidence, Townsell was not harmed by the admission of Jacobs' testimony. United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746, 754 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at trial as to appellant Townsell to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as determined by a rational trier of fact. See Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 609 P.2d 309 (1980). We will, therefore, not disturb his judgment of conviction.
In conclusion, we recognize that the exigencies of the modern day call for sophisticated and resourceful law enforcement methods. We have no wish to interfere with innovative police practices so long as they do not diminish rights fundamental to the American form of government. Nonetheless, this court is obligated to enforce the constitutions of the United States and Nevada, and we therefore cannot permit police ploys that subvert constitutional guarantees which are designed to assure fairness and integrity in the truth-seeking process. "Disinterested zeal for the public good does not assure either right or wisdom in the methods it pursues." Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
We have considered appellants' remaining contentions and we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we hereby affirm appellant Townsell's judgment of conviction. For the reasons set forth above, however, we hereby reverse appellant Holy-field's conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
Springer, C. J., concurs.
Detective Eubanks of the Reno Police Department, who apparently led the questioning, testified at appellant's trial: "I told Holyfield that the car he was driving in was seen being used as the getaway car from a credit union robbery on Bible Way in Reno. And I had information that I knew he did it, was part of it, and there were other people involved. And asked if he would like to tell me about it."
At trial, however, Roy Joshua, a prisoner in the cell contemporaneously with Holyfield, testified that he overheard Jacobs questioning Holyfield and that Holyfield did not discuss the credit union robbery. Joshua testfied that Holyfield, in response to Jacobs' questioning, told Jacobs that "he didn't know what Jacobs was talking about."
On at least three occasions in response to questions by this court at oral argument, the State conceded that Jacobs knew they expected him to elicit information from Holyfield:
Court: He knew that they wanted him to get into a conversation about the robbery, though; he knew that, didn't he?
Prosecutor: Who did?
Court: Jacobs.
Prosecutor: Yes.
Court: He absolutely knew that the purpose of putting him in the cell was so that he could get information from the defendant in this case.
Prosecutor: That — that is clearly correct.
Prosecutor: The Police did want information through Obbie Jacobs, and Obbie Jacobs knew that he had a job to do when he got into the jail cell. I can see—
Court: That's right. So they [the police] put him in there to bring the conversation around to the subject, and basically, subtly perhaps, but in fact—
Prosecutor: No question about it.
Court: No question about it that he was there to interrogate the defendant, right?
Prosecutor: They told him not to interrogate him. But, yes, if you want to use the word "subtly" or whatever—
Court: He was expected to conduct a subtle interrogation of this man, wasn't he?
Prosecutor: He was told not to interrogate Mr. Holyfield, but yes, in a sense, you're correct.
Court: And I believe you also indicated that you couldn't argue with my statement that he knew that he was expected to elicit information from the defendant. Right?
Prosecutor: That's correct. I can't argue with that.
At trial, Jacobs confirmed that he was told Holyfield would be his cellmate and was "placed there for purposes of gathering information for them" about robberies the police believed Holyfield had committed.
Although the court in Innis stated that this definition of interrogation primarily focuses on the perception of the suspect, this was to remove the necessity of proving the underlying intent of the police in ambiguous circumstances. See id. at 301. The court did, however, allow for inquiry into the intent of the 'police. "This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect." Id. at 301 n.7
Indeed, at trial, Detective Eubanks testified:
The whole thing came about, was that Mr. Jacobs was placed in a cell in the Sparks Police Department by Sparks Police Department officers, at the request of myself and Detective Kimpton and Detective Zamboni of the Sparks Police.
Because Mr. Holyfield, the defendant, was acquainted with Mr. Jacobs from a prior contact in another detention facility. And that if Mr. Holyfield had any tendency to start talking about any crimes he might have done, that would be a very likely person he might make those statements to.
Contrary to the state's suggestion, this is not a case of the police obtaining information through the misplaced confidence of Holyfield because Jacobs was working directly as a police agent. He was doing that which the police themselves could not do. Compare United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1972) with United States v. Mitchell, 417 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1969).
It is, of course, especially unfair and dilutes due process when police utilize an agent whose character is so dubious that he may not relate conversations accurately, but instead may structure his reports in any way he believes will please the police and benefit himself.
The prosecution has cited only one decision to support its contention, i. e. State v. McDonald, 387 So.2d 1116 (La. 1980), in which two justices strenuously dissented, supporting the prevailing view, as articulated herein, and stating inter alia: "In my judgment it is a violation of an accused's Miranda rights for the police to accomplish by subterfuge and trickery, in the form of a paid informer, that which the police cannot do under color of law. In this instance, the informer was not compensated in material form, but in the form of a promise of leniency and the dismissal of criminal charges pending against him. He was acting with the consent of, pursuant to the authority of, and subject to the direction and supervision of the police. He was in law and in fact an agent of the police." 387 So.2d at 1124.
Contrary to the state's suggestion, it appears that Jacobs benefitted from his participation in this scheme. The record reveals that a representative of the Reno Police Department wrote a letter to the Parole Board indicating that Jacobs had cooperated with law enforcement authorities. Moreover, Jacobs was paroled after serving 19 months of a two-year prisión sentence. Interestingly, Jacobs served this time in the county jail, rather than the state prison.
Wholly apart from our discussion of federal law, we hold that the conduct of the police in this case denied Holyfield the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by article 1 section 8 of the Nevada Constitution. As the Miranda court did in discussing the Fifth Amendment, we have stated that the privilege is intented to promote the truth-finding function in criminal proceedings. See State of Nevada v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 82-83 (1879).
Although appellants do not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of Jacobs' testimony, we note that the State has seen fit to argue that Holyfield's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. In light of our conclusion that Holyfield's rights against self-incrimination were violated by the admission of Jacobs' statements, and that Jacobs' statements were therefore inadmissible, we decline to address the state's arguments concerning the Sixth Amendment.